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Quality standards and incentives in managed care organizations' specialty contracts for behavioral health.
J Ment Health Policy Econ. 2002 Jun; 5(2):61-9.JM

Abstract

BACKGROUND

In the US, most privately insured individuals are enrolled with managed care organizations (MCOs), and a majority of these organizations have subcontracted responsibility for behavioral health care to specialized vendors. Based on economic theory, we anticipate that MCOs should be more likely to require quality standards in contracts that transfer all financial risk to the vendor.

AIMS OF THE STUDY

To test whether use of quality standards in behavioral health subcontracts differs between MCOs that transfer full financial risk and other MCOs. Similarly, to test for differences between for-profit and nonprofit MCOs.

METHODS

Bivariate tests and logistic regression analysis of the use of five quality-related standards, and the use of any standard, in a nationally representative sample of commercial MCO products in 60 US market areas. Statistical controls include MCO size, chain affiliation, region and market size.

RESULTS

All five standards we examined were widely used in behavioral health subcontracts (varying from 47% to 70% of products). However, contrary to our hypothesis, the standards are not more commonly used by MCO products with unlimited capitated contracts for behavioral health. In most cases the opposite is true. In addition, for-profit plans were more rather than less likely to use several of the standards.

DISCUSSION

MCOs that transfer full risk may be using mechanisms other than quality standards (e.g. periodic rebidding) to prevent skimping; may be less concerned about quality anyway; or may be more skeptical about the value of existing standards. The fact that for-profit plans are equally or more likely to use these standards may reveal that their objectives are not different from those of nonprofits, or that competition is constraining them to adopt standards anyway. Limitations of this study include the lack of more detailed data on the nature of financial risk-sharing, and on the types of financial penalties associated with each standard.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH POLICY

Pressure for accreditation appears to be an effective vehicle for encouraging the spread of standards. It would be useful to know how far use of these quality standards in contracts is linked to better quality of care.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Further studies should examine the relationship between quality standards and quality of care

Authors+Show Affiliations

Heller School, MS 035, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02454-9110, USA. hodgkin@brandeis.eduNo affiliation info availableNo affiliation info availableNo affiliation info available

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.

Language

eng

PubMed ID

12529562

Citation

Hodgkin, Dominic, et al. "Quality Standards and Incentives in Managed Care Organizations' Specialty Contracts for Behavioral Health." The Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 2002, pp. 61-9.
Hodgkin D, Horgan CM, Garnick DW, et al. Quality standards and incentives in managed care organizations' specialty contracts for behavioral health. J Ment Health Policy Econ. 2002;5(2):61-9.
Hodgkin, D., Horgan, C. M., Garnick, D. W., & Merrick, E. L. (2002). Quality standards and incentives in managed care organizations' specialty contracts for behavioral health. The Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, 5(2), 61-9.
Hodgkin D, et al. Quality Standards and Incentives in Managed Care Organizations' Specialty Contracts for Behavioral Health. J Ment Health Policy Econ. 2002;5(2):61-9. PubMed PMID: 12529562.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - Quality standards and incentives in managed care organizations' specialty contracts for behavioral health. AU - Hodgkin,Dominic, AU - Horgan,Constance M, AU - Garnick,Deborah W, AU - Merrick,Elizabeth L, PY - 2002/08/01/received PY - 2002/10/16/accepted PY - 2003/1/17/pubmed PY - 2003/8/6/medline PY - 2003/1/17/entrez SP - 61 EP - 9 JF - The journal of mental health policy and economics JO - J Ment Health Policy Econ VL - 5 IS - 2 N2 - BACKGROUND: In the US, most privately insured individuals are enrolled with managed care organizations (MCOs), and a majority of these organizations have subcontracted responsibility for behavioral health care to specialized vendors. Based on economic theory, we anticipate that MCOs should be more likely to require quality standards in contracts that transfer all financial risk to the vendor. AIMS OF THE STUDY: To test whether use of quality standards in behavioral health subcontracts differs between MCOs that transfer full financial risk and other MCOs. Similarly, to test for differences between for-profit and nonprofit MCOs. METHODS: Bivariate tests and logistic regression analysis of the use of five quality-related standards, and the use of any standard, in a nationally representative sample of commercial MCO products in 60 US market areas. Statistical controls include MCO size, chain affiliation, region and market size. RESULTS: All five standards we examined were widely used in behavioral health subcontracts (varying from 47% to 70% of products). However, contrary to our hypothesis, the standards are not more commonly used by MCO products with unlimited capitated contracts for behavioral health. In most cases the opposite is true. In addition, for-profit plans were more rather than less likely to use several of the standards. DISCUSSION: MCOs that transfer full risk may be using mechanisms other than quality standards (e.g. periodic rebidding) to prevent skimping; may be less concerned about quality anyway; or may be more skeptical about the value of existing standards. The fact that for-profit plans are equally or more likely to use these standards may reveal that their objectives are not different from those of nonprofits, or that competition is constraining them to adopt standards anyway. Limitations of this study include the lack of more detailed data on the nature of financial risk-sharing, and on the types of financial penalties associated with each standard. IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH POLICY: Pressure for accreditation appears to be an effective vehicle for encouraging the spread of standards. It would be useful to know how far use of these quality standards in contracts is linked to better quality of care. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: Further studies should examine the relationship between quality standards and quality of care SN - 1091-4358 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/12529562/Quality_standards_and_incentives_in_managed_care_organizations'_specialty_contracts_for_behavioral_health_ DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -