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Disclosure of medical injury to patients: an improbable risk management strategy.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2007 Jan-Feb; 26(1):215-26.HA

Abstract

Pressure mounts on physicians and hospitals to disclose adverse outcomes of care to patients. Although such transparency diverges from traditional risk management strategy, recent commentary has suggested that disclosure will actually reduce providers' liability exposure. We tested this theory by modeling the litigation consequences of disclosure. We found that forecasts of reduced litigation volume or cost do not withstand close scrutiny. A policy question more pressing than whether moving toward routine disclosure will expand litigation is the question of how large such an expansion might be.

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Publisher Full Text

Authors+Show Affiliations

Studdert DM
Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA. studdert@hsph.harvard.edu
Mello MM
No affiliation info available
Gawande AA
No affiliation info available
Brennan TA
No affiliation info available
Wang YC
No affiliation info available

MeSH

Compensation and RedressDisclosureEconomics, HospitalEconomics, MedicalHealth Care SurveysHumansIatrogenic DiseaseIncidenceInjury Severity ScoreLiability, LegalMalpracticeMedical ErrorsMonte Carlo MethodRisk ManagementUnited StatesWounds and Injuries

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

Language

eng

PubMed ID

17211031

Citation

Studdert, David M., et al. "Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: an Improbable Risk Management Strategy." Health Affairs (Project Hope), vol. 26, no. 1, 2007, pp. 215-26.
Studdert DM, Mello MM, Gawande AA, et al. Disclosure of medical injury to patients: an improbable risk management strategy. Health Aff (Millwood). 2007;26(1):215-26.
Studdert, D. M., Mello, M. M., Gawande, A. A., Brennan, T. A., & Wang, Y. C. (2007). Disclosure of medical injury to patients: an improbable risk management strategy. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 26(1), 215-26.
Studdert DM, et al. Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: an Improbable Risk Management Strategy. Health Aff (Millwood). 2007 Jan-Feb;26(1):215-26. PubMed PMID: 17211031.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - Disclosure of medical injury to patients: an improbable risk management strategy. AU - Studdert,David M, AU - Mello,Michelle M, AU - Gawande,Atul A, AU - Brennan,Troyen A, AU - Wang,Y Claire, PY - 2007/1/11/pubmed PY - 2007/5/9/medline PY - 2007/1/11/entrez SP - 215 EP - 26 JF - Health affairs (Project Hope) JO - Health Aff (Millwood) VL - 26 IS - 1 N2 - Pressure mounts on physicians and hospitals to disclose adverse outcomes of care to patients. Although such transparency diverges from traditional risk management strategy, recent commentary has suggested that disclosure will actually reduce providers' liability exposure. We tested this theory by modeling the litigation consequences of disclosure. We found that forecasts of reduced litigation volume or cost do not withstand close scrutiny. A policy question more pressing than whether moving toward routine disclosure will expand litigation is the question of how large such an expansion might be. SN - 1544-5208 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/17211031/Disclosure_of_medical_injury_to_patients:_an_improbable_risk_management_strategy_ L2 - https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.26.1.215?url_ver=Z39.88-2003&rfr_id=ori:rid:crossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub=pubmed DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -