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Two concepts of empirical ethics.
Bioethics. 2009 May; 23(4):202-13.B

Abstract

The turn to empirical ethics answers two calls. The first is for a richer account of morality than that afforded by bioethical principlism, which is cast as excessively abstract and thin on the facts. The second is for the facts in question to be those of human experience and not some other, unworldly realm. Empirical ethics therefore promises a richer naturalistic ethics, but in fulfilling the second call it often fails to heed the metaethical requirements related to the first. Empirical ethics risks losing the normative edge which necessarily characterizes the ethical, by failing to account for the nature and the logic of moral norms. I sketch a naturalistic theory, teleological expressivism (TE), which negotiates the naturalistic fallacy by providing a more satisfactory means of taking into account facts and research data with ethical implications. The examples of informed consent and the euthanasia debate are used to illustrate the superiority of this approach, and the problems consequent on including the facts in the wrong kind of way.

Authors+Show Affiliations

University of Queensland, School of Medicine, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. m.parker@uq.edu.au

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article
Review

Language

eng

PubMed ID

19338521

Citation

Parker, Malcolm. "Two Concepts of Empirical Ethics." Bioethics, vol. 23, no. 4, 2009, pp. 202-13.
Parker M. Two concepts of empirical ethics. Bioethics. 2009;23(4):202-13.
Parker, M. (2009). Two concepts of empirical ethics. Bioethics, 23(4), 202-13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01708.x
Parker M. Two Concepts of Empirical Ethics. Bioethics. 2009;23(4):202-13. PubMed PMID: 19338521.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - Two concepts of empirical ethics. A1 - Parker,Malcolm, PY - 2009/4/3/entrez PY - 2009/4/3/pubmed PY - 2009/8/8/medline SP - 202 EP - 13 JF - Bioethics JO - Bioethics VL - 23 IS - 4 N2 - The turn to empirical ethics answers two calls. The first is for a richer account of morality than that afforded by bioethical principlism, which is cast as excessively abstract and thin on the facts. The second is for the facts in question to be those of human experience and not some other, unworldly realm. Empirical ethics therefore promises a richer naturalistic ethics, but in fulfilling the second call it often fails to heed the metaethical requirements related to the first. Empirical ethics risks losing the normative edge which necessarily characterizes the ethical, by failing to account for the nature and the logic of moral norms. I sketch a naturalistic theory, teleological expressivism (TE), which negotiates the naturalistic fallacy by providing a more satisfactory means of taking into account facts and research data with ethical implications. The examples of informed consent and the euthanasia debate are used to illustrate the superiority of this approach, and the problems consequent on including the facts in the wrong kind of way. SN - 1467-8519 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/19338521/Two_concepts_of_empirical_ethics_ L2 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01708.x DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -