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Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action?
Cogn Sci. 2011 Aug; 35(6):1076-104.CS

Abstract

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale's dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related "unconscious" stream and a ventral, perception-related "conscious" stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.

Authors+Show Affiliations

Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Missouri, St. Louis, USA. brogaardb@gmail.com

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article

Language

eng

PubMed ID

21790744

Citation

Brogaard, Berit. "Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?" Cognitive Science, vol. 35, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1076-104.
Brogaard B. Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action? Cogn Sci. 2011;35(6):1076-104.
Brogaard, B. (2011). Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action? Cognitive Science, 35(6), 1076-104. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01171.x
Brogaard B. Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action. Cogn Sci. 2011;35(6):1076-104. PubMed PMID: 21790744.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action? A1 - Brogaard,Berit, Y1 - 2011/03/07/ PY - 2011/7/28/entrez PY - 2011/7/28/pubmed PY - 2011/12/13/medline SP - 1076 EP - 104 JF - Cognitive science JO - Cogn Sci VL - 35 IS - 6 N2 - David Milner and Melvyn Goodale's dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related "unconscious" stream and a ventral, perception-related "conscious" stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Dassonville & Bala, 2004; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action-guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi-conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division. SN - 1551-6709 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/21790744/Conscious_vision_for_action_versus_unconscious_vision_for_action L2 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01171.x DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -