Tags

Type your tag names separated by a space and hit enter

CEO traits, dynamic compensation and capital structure.
PLoS One. 2019; 14(2):e0211422.Plos

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of managerial traits, i.e. optimism, confidence and risk aversion, on capital structure using a principle-agent framework. We discover that optimistic manager perceives equity as more undervalued than debt, while, confident manager perceives debt as more undervalued than equity. We also find that there exists the level of risk aversion eliminating the impact of optimism and confidence on the leverage. Furthermore, in contrast to rational manager, the optimistic/confident manger has higher level of effort. And then, the increasing in risk aversion reduces the level of effort. Our results are in line with some empirical findings.

Authors+Show Affiliations

School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha, China.College of Mathematics and statistics, Jishou University, Jishou, China.

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article

Language

eng

PubMed ID

30759141

Citation

Ye, Wei, and Yong Zhang. "CEO Traits, Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure." PloS One, vol. 14, no. 2, 2019, pp. e0211422.
Ye W, Zhang Y. CEO traits, dynamic compensation and capital structure. PLoS ONE. 2019;14(2):e0211422.
Ye, W., & Zhang, Y. (2019). CEO traits, dynamic compensation and capital structure. PloS One, 14(2), e0211422. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211422
Ye W, Zhang Y. CEO Traits, Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure. PLoS ONE. 2019;14(2):e0211422. PubMed PMID: 30759141.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - CEO traits, dynamic compensation and capital structure. AU - Ye,Wei, AU - Zhang,Yong, Y1 - 2019/02/13/ PY - 2018/08/04/received PY - 2019/01/14/accepted PY - 2019/2/14/entrez PY - 2019/2/14/pubmed PY - 2019/11/23/medline SP - e0211422 EP - e0211422 JF - PloS one JO - PLoS ONE VL - 14 IS - 2 N2 - This paper studies the impact of managerial traits, i.e. optimism, confidence and risk aversion, on capital structure using a principle-agent framework. We discover that optimistic manager perceives equity as more undervalued than debt, while, confident manager perceives debt as more undervalued than equity. We also find that there exists the level of risk aversion eliminating the impact of optimism and confidence on the leverage. Furthermore, in contrast to rational manager, the optimistic/confident manger has higher level of effort. And then, the increasing in risk aversion reduces the level of effort. Our results are in line with some empirical findings. SN - 1932-6203 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/30759141/CEO_traits_dynamic_compensation_and_capital_structure_ L2 - http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211422 DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -