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Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences.
Front Psychol 2019; 10:2430FP

Abstract

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value-assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well-namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research.

Authors+Show Affiliations

Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, United States.Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY, United States.

Pub Type(s)

Journal Article
Review

Language

eng

PubMed ID

31736829

Citation

Cornwell, James F M., and E Tory Higgins. "Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: the Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences." Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 10, 2019, p. 2430.
Cornwell JFM, Higgins ET. Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences. Front Psychol. 2019;10:2430.
Cornwell, J. F. M., & Higgins, E. T. (2019). Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, p. 2430. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02430.
Cornwell JFM, Higgins ET. Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: the Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences. Front Psychol. 2019;10:2430. PubMed PMID: 31736829.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - JOUR T1 - Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences. AU - Cornwell,James F M, AU - Higgins,E Tory, Y1 - 2019/10/30/ PY - 2019/07/19/received PY - 2019/10/14/accepted PY - 2019/11/19/entrez PY - 2019/11/19/pubmed PY - 2019/11/19/medline KW - control motivation KW - epistemic feelings KW - judgment KW - morality KW - truth motivation SP - 2430 EP - 2430 JF - Frontiers in psychology JO - Front Psychol VL - 10 N2 - Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value-assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well-namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research. SN - 1664-1078 UR - https://www.unboundmedicine.com/medline/citation/31736829/Beyond_Value_in_Moral_Phenomenology:_The_Role_of_Epistemic_and_Control_Experiences L2 - https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02430 DB - PRIME DP - Unbound Medicine ER -
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